What to Know about DUI Field Sobriety Tests in RI
Field sobriety tests are used by law enforcement officials, including highway patrolling state troopers and local municipal police departments, to establish if a driving motorist is under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Most typically, a field sobriety check is given during a traffic stop. If you or a loved one have been subjected to a field sobriety test and are fighting a driving under the influence charge, call an experienced Rhode Island DUI attorney who can file help you fight your Rhode Island DUI charge.
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Rhode Island’s Ignition Interlock DUI Laws – RI Hardship License or Work License
Although the law is more than two years old, many of Rhode Island’s citizens are not aware of the ignition interlock law of 2015. The Rhode Island legislature looked to the Rhode Island State Police, whom have trained with other state police departments where interlock laws already exist. States that have used this system have seen an average of a two-thirds reduction in repeat offenses. It is expected that these ignition interlocking systems will allow for the reduction of fatal DUI accidents, which, in turn, will also reduce the amount of Rhode Island DUI lawsuits. Drunk Driving advocacy groups also seemed to support the policy behind the passage of this new law. In addition, this law enables a convicted motorist, or a motorist who has a pending case with a preliminary suspension, to operate a vehicle for a particular purpose, with the device installed in the vehicle. Read More...
Can I Be Charged With an Underage DUI In Rhode Island?
Although the legal drinking age in Rhode Island is twenty-one years old, it is of no surprise that those who are younger also partake in the consumption of alcohol. With the legal driving age in Rhode Island being sixteen years old, the unfortunate mixture of alcohol and driving by a minor happens far too often. But what happens when an underage motorist is pulled over with alcohol in their possession or the motorist is under the influence of alcohol? An experienced Rhode Island DUI lawyer can help those who have been charged with a DUI. Read More...
What To Know About Field Sobriety Tests In Rhode Island
Field sobriety tests are used by law enforcement officials, including highway patrolling state troopers and local municipality police departments, to establish if a driving motorist is under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Most typically, a field sobriety check is given during a traffic stop, although most departments have the option of additional tests at the police department. If you or a loved one have been subjected to a field sobriety test and are fighting a driving under the influence charge, call an experienced Rhode Island DUI attorney who can file help you fight your Rhode Island DUI charge.
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What do I do if pulled over by police?
Read here about how RI DUI attorney Kevin Hagan explained to the Newport Buzz what to do if you are pulled over by the police. Read More...
"DUI Checkpoints are illegal in Rhode Island; however…"
DUI checkpoints continue to generate a lot of debate and discussion.
The latest skirmish involving DUI checkpoints comes from at least two states that are now reconsidering the legality and effectiveness of DUI checkpoints in the first place. In Utah, a bill will soon be considered by the state House of Representatives that would completely ban police from setting up DUI checkpoints, FOX 13 reports. Utah state Rep. David Butterfield, a sponsor of the bill, believes that DUI checkpoints violate citizens' rights against unreasonable searches. "The Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have both held that they are constitutional under very narrow guidelines, but that's problematic," he said.
Similarly, WestIslip Patch reports, New Hampshire lawmakers are also considering a proposal to prohibit state police from setting up DUI checkpoints, again citing possible violations of citizen's civil rights. According to the Patch, New Hampshire lawmakers are concerned with citizens' "due process rights when they are arrested for other violations or their vehicles are searched."
Supporters of DUI checkpoints such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving argue that the tactic does improve public safety. They add that checkpoints do not violate civil rights because citizens are only detained briefly and strict guidelines govern what police may and may not do in connection with the checkpoints.
The current debate follows the discussion in many jurisdictions last year as to whether it is a good thing or a bad thing for people to spread the word that checkpoints are in place at a particular time and place. In May 2011, I wrote here about how several senators were pressing Apple, Google and Research In Motion to stop selling or otherwise making available smartphone apps that help drunk drivers avoid DUI checkpoints, asserting that such apps were "harmful to public safety."
In December 2011 I noted that police in Edmonton and Calgary, Canada, had begun asking the public to refrain from tweeting the locations of DUI checkpoints set up to catch drunk drivers, because they said doing so may put other motorists in danger. This position was not shared by police in Saskatoon, Canada, however, who took the opposite approach and even started alerting citizens themselves using Twitter as to when checkpoints were planned. The Saskatoon police believe that if people know police checkpoints are in place, they will think twice about drunk driving.
Jamestown, Rhode Island DUI - DWI - OWI
Arrests for drunk driving account for approximately 25% of all arrests made by the Jamestown Police Department. The number of drunken driving arrests and alcohol related motor vehicle accidents has continued to rise over the past several years.
The Jamestown Police Department aggressively enforces the driving under the influence (DUI) and speed laws throughout the year with special attention to the holiday seasons as part of a statewide effort to reduce deaths and injuries on Rhode Island roads. Police agencies from across Rhode Island are out in force as part of "Operation Blue Riptide", an enforcement and education campaign funded by the State's Highway Safety Office and the New England Region of the National Traffic Safety Administration. The Jamestown Police Department works in partnership with State Police and police from neighboring cities & towns to enforce the DUI and speed laws across jurisdictions.
Throughout the year additional patrols will be assigned exclusively to enforce DUI and speed laws in the Town of Jamestown. As such, Jamestown makes a significant number of DUI arrests considering the small population that lives on the Island. Most of the Town’s DUI arrests tend to occur when the Island’s bars let out after 1 a.m. Nearby to this business area is where the Island’s two main roads intersect, and it is also the area where most DUI investigations commence. At this time of the night a vehicle will often times be stopped initially for a laned roadway violation or a speeding violation. Of course, neither of these violations by themselves will give rise to an inference that the operator is incapable of safely operating the motor vehicle.
In the vehicle in motion phase, the police officer will observe an individual’s driving behavior, and look for clues claimed by NHTSA to be consistent with impaired driving. In DWI or DUI cases, these driving behaviors include swerving, driving erratically, driving on the wrong side of the road or driving with the lights off.
In DWI or DUI investigations, the personal contact phase of the investigation takes place after the police officer has already made the decision to stop an individual and initiate an investigation. This phase includes face-to-face contact with the driver. During this phase, the police officer will attempt to gauge whether the driver is sober based on his appearance, behavior, smell, balance, coordination, his manner of speaking, and any statements he may make. DWI and DUI criminal defense lawyers know that this phase of the investigation can lead to unreliable conclusions. After all, the police officer has not previously met the suspect, so it is questionable whether he can determine what the suspect is “normally” like.
In any event, in DUI or DWI investigations, if the police officer believes that the suspect is intoxicated after phase one and phase two are completed, he may then move into phase three, where the police officer will administer standardized field sobriety tests. The tests outlined by NHTSA are standardized, meaning that they are conducted the same in all DWI or DUI investigations in Jamestown and anywhere. The three standardized tests include the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the one-leg stand, and the walk and turn. DWI and DUI criminal defense attorney also know that problems in the administration of the test are common. A surprising number of officers do not follow the guidelines set out by NHTSA.
DWI and DUI law can be specialized and it is important to hire an experienced criminal defense attorney if you are charged with a DWI or DUI in Newport County. An experienced criminal defense lawyer will be able to aggressively challenge each phase of the police’s investigation, with the goal of achieving the best possible result in your case.
Middletown, Rhode Island DUI - DWI - OWI
The Middletown Police Department makes more arrests for DUI than any other police department in Newport County. Therefore, it is essential to have an intimate knowledge of the roads and areas where most of these arrests occur. Bordered by Newport and Portsmouth on either side, DUI arrests in Middletown can raise issues concerning extra-territorial jurisdiction if the law enforcement officer encroaches into another municipality. Middletown, Rhode Island police officers will often times utilize the services of a Justice of the Peace to arraign DUI suspects after hours. This procedure can avail the suspect of an opportunity to obtain an independent physical examination by a physician of his/her own choosing.
Many DUI arrests in Middletown tend to occur on West Main Road, which is a heavily travelled four-lane highway with numerous retail establishments at every intersection. It may prove difficult for police officers to properly administer the standardized field sobriety tests in these areas and passing traffic can distract and interfere with the suspect’s ability to perform certain divided attention tests. In addition, Middletown has a fairly new police station, and it is necessary that a defense attorney has an idea of the layout. These issues can affect the confidentiality of phone calls and the ability of the police to have the suspect perform field sobriety tests in the station. While some police departments have ceased using in-station video surveillance, it is available and utilized in Middletown, which can often shed light on issues involving observations of the suspect.
The Middletown police force tends to be very young, but they are a well-trained and highly supervised group of officers. As a result, very few cases involving the Middletown Police actually end up at the trial stage, and the officers are generally not accustomed to testifying on a regular basis. For a DUI attorney familiar with Middletown, RI DUI arrests call Kevin Hagan, Esq. for a free consult today.
For more information about the Middletown Police Department, please visit: http://www.middletownri.com/documents/mpd/Services.php
Fax: (401) 846-0175
Hours: General business hours, 8am - 4pm. Other hours for certain programs may vary by service. For more details, please visit http://www.middletownri.com/documents/mpd/Services.php
Handicap Accessible: Main entrance from parking lot.
Founding Date: 1/1/1922
Services: Anonymous Tip Line: (401) 842-6516 A full listing of services is available at: http://www.middletownri.com/documents/mpd/Services.php
Parking: Free lot
Public restrooms: Yes
Wi-Fi: None
Auxiliary: Yes
Bureaus: Detective, Traffic
"Rhode Island DUI Field Testing"
The Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test is often the first one used to assess a person's level of intoxication. Horizontal gaze nystagmus is the term used to describe the involuntary jerking of a person's eye which can occur when one's gaze is cast to the side. Nystagmus is used as an indicator of impairment because it becomes exaggerated when intoxicated and can occur at lesser angles than those that would normally provoke an eye jerk. Typically, an officer will move a flashlight or lighted pen and ask the suspect to follow the light with their eyes. This allows the officer to track the eye movement of the suspect and identify whether or not they are able to accurately follow a slowly moving object without any eye jerking or deviation. When an individual is unable to complete the light tracking without faulty eye movement, officers may have further reason to assume that the suspect has been driving under the influence. While NHTSA research has found that about 88% of persons who show signs of horizontal gaze nystagmus are also intoxicated, it cannot be assumed that this is the only cause. The failure in this test lies in the fact that nystagmus is a common clinical condition that plagues several thousand people throughout the U.S. Furthermore, it often goes unrecognized and undiagnosed. Therefore, it could be argued that the field sobriety test involving HGN is not a great way to identify intoxication, as the results of the test could simply signify that the person suffers from a nystagmus condition.
The second standardized test used by police officers during a roadside check for sobriety is the Walk and Turn test. This is a type of "divided attention" test which requires a driver to utilize both listening/ comprehension skills as well as physical capabilities; the theory being that impaired persons are unable to divide their skills between mental and physical tasks. When a suspect is directed to perform the Walk and Turn test they will be asked to take heel-to-toe steps along a straight, linear path. After a certain amount of steps have been taken in one direction, the individual will then be asked to turn around on one foot and repeat the heel-to-walking in the other direction. Among the indicators that officers will be looking for during this type of test are a suspect's ability to keep balance, turn properly, take the correct number of steps in the correct way (i.e. heel to toe), stay on the linear path, walk the line without using arms to balance, and listen to and follow instructions properly. However, it can be more than difficult for even unimpaired individuals to successfully follow some of these procedures. Therefore, relying on the indication of two more of these signs for confirmation that a person's cognitive and mental skills are impaired is an unsafe way to determine impairment.
The third of the standardized tests is the One Leg Stand test. Like the Walk and Turn test, this is one that focuses on the ability of person to utilize their divided attention skills. Upon being pulled over, an officer may ask the driver to stand with one foot on the ground while the other is held approximately six inches off the ground. At the same time, suspects will be asked to count by thousands while the officer conducting the test records signs of impairment for a period of 30 seconds. During this timed event, law enforcement officials will be looking for indicators such as swaying, unsecure balance, hopping to maintain stance, using arms to help with balance, and putting your raised foot down. According to NHTSA, a little over 80% of persons who exhibit two or more of these behaviors during their performance of the One Leg Stand will have a blood alcohol concentration level above the legal limit. Again, what is failed to be mentioned is the fact that this can be a less than easy task for anyone, sober or not. Some people naturally have a more difficult time maintaining their balance in even the most normal of circumstances, making an on-the-spot test of balance one that could yield inaccurate results.
The inadequacy of these standardized tests has not failed to be recognized. In fact, other non-standard tests have been put in place to supplement those implemented by the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration. The Rhomberg Stationary Balance Test requires drivers to stand with feet together while leaning back to look up at the sky and holding their arms out to the side. The Finger-to-Nose Test asks suspects to close their eyes and then touch their nose with their pointer finger. These, along with standardized test methods, are believed to be the clearest ways to quickly identify alcohol or drug impairment. Unfortunately, they are also tasks which many non-intoxicated individuals would be unable to complete if asked to do so. Therefore, their accuracy is less than reliable and should not be used as a primary source of intoxication identification. If you have recently been arrested based on your performance of a field sobriety test such as those described above, then you should most definitely challenge the charges that have been brought against you. With the help of a DUI defense attorney you can use the inaccuracies of these methods to prove that your DUI arrest was not founded on sound evidence and should not lead to a conviction.
"DUI Chemical Testing and Breathalyzer Challenges"
There are four basic scientific tests which may be conducted to determine the degree of intoxication: blood, urine, breath, and saliva tests. The results of urine, saliva, and breath tests for alcohol must be converted into a blood-alcohol reading in order to be useful in determining whether the subject was intoxicated.
Cases:
Confrontation Clause challenges to lab reports: Toxicology data generated by lab machines from testing of defendant's blood sample, indicating that defendant's blood contained phencyclidine (PCP) and alcohol, did not constitute "hearsay" evidence, subject to the Confrontation Clause, in prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, as the machines were not persons or declarants within the meaning of the hearsay rule. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6; Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 801(c), 28 U.S.C.A. U.S. v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 74 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 332 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 14, 2007)
In People v. Superior Court (1972) 6 Cal 3d 757, 100 Cal Rptr 281, 493 P2d 1145, defendant, who had been in an automobile accident but had not been arrested, was awaiting emergency treatment in a hospital and he signed, at a police officer's request, a written consent authorizing the taking of a blood sample for purposes of a blood-alcohol test. The Supreme Court of California rejected the People's contention that the taking of a blood sample in a medically approved manner but without consent does not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments where there is probable cause to arrest, even though the taking is not pursuant to a search warrant or incident to a lawful arrest. The court disapproved several appeal court decisions insofar as they were inconsistent with this opinion and observed that the taking of a sample under the state implied consent law is expressly conditioned on a lawful arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and upon the reasonable belief of the peace officer that the arrestee was, in fact, so driving. The Supreme Court noted that the burden of justifying the taking without a search warrant had not been met, since evidence sustained the trial court's determination that the consent, the only justification offered by the People, had not been free and voluntary.
A compulsory seizure of blood for a blood-alcohol test, without a warrant, is permissible if the procedure (1) is done in a reasonable, medically approved manner, (2) is incident to a lawful arrest, and (3) is based on a reasonable belief that the arrestee is intoxicated. Thus, the lack of informed consent did not make the withdrawal of blood from a driver arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol an unreasonable seizure, where the sample was taken at the police station without the driver's consent but without force, by a licensed clinical technologist, using a standard procedure and materials obtained from a local hospital. Withdrawal of a blood sample from a driver arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol at the police station without his consent, but without force, by a licensed clinical technologist using a standard procedure and materials obtained from a local hospital, did not deviate so far from reasonable medical practices as to constitute a constitutionally impermissible seizure. Thus, the municipal court did not err in dismissing the driver's motion to suppress the blood sample. The technologist certified the procedure used was medically approved; the technologist was described by his supervisor as "an outstanding phlebotomist"; apart from the issues of consent and authorization, defendant did not object to the manner in which the blood was withdrawn; and nothing suggested that performing the test in a jail rather than a hospital was unsafe or unsanitary. The seizure was not unreasonable per se merely because no injury or accident was involved or because of the misdemeanor nature of the offense. Given the seriousness of the threat posed by drunken driving, the fact that defendant was charged with driving with a blood-alcohol level of.08 or greater, and the evidentiary value of a blood test in such a prosecution, the community's need for evidence outweighed defendant's interest in privacy and security. People v. Ford (1992, 6th Dist) 4 Cal App 4th 32, 5 Cal Rptr 2d 189, 92 Daily Journal DAR 2757, review den (May 21, 1992).
In prosecution for driving under influence of alcohol, felony hit and run, and vehicular manslaughter, police officers were not required to obtain search warrant to forcibly extract blood sample from defendant's arm, where defendant, arrested for felony drunk driving, refused to provide sample of blood or urine so that his blood alcohol level could be determined and where defendant was under arrest, probable cause existed for taking blood and facts presented type of emergency situation in which there was no need for warrant; further, police officers did not violate defendant's due process rights, where officers used only that degree of force reasonably necessary to overcome defendant's combativeness and where withdrawal of blood was accomplished in medically approved manner. Carleton v. Superior Court (1985, 4th Dist) 170 Cal App 3d 1182, 216 Cal Rptr 890.
Drivers' consent to an alcohol breath test was not voluntarily given, where after being arrested for DUI, each driver submitted to a breathalyzer test after being informed of the implied consent warnings that if they failed to submit to an approved chemical test, their drivers' licenses would be suspended and evidence of refusal would be used at trial, but when it appeared that the intoximeter had been substantially modified and the modified instrument had not been recertified, drivers argued that their consent had not been voluntary, and that the results of the tests should be suppressed, because the changes were so substantial that the instrument required full recertification; additionally, since consent was based on misinformation that the chemical test was by an approved instrument consent was not voluntary. State v. Polak (1992, Fla App D1) 598 So 2d 150, 17 FLW D 1014.
Substantial evidence supported finding that officer complied with statutorily required 20-minute observation period before administering breath alcohol test; officer testified that he began observing defendant at 11:13 p.m. and administered the test beginning at 11:36 p.m., despite fact that jail records indicated defendant was admitted at 11:22 p.m., jailer testified that person admitting defendant probably took log-in time off of the computer screen in admission room, and that jail made no efforts to synchronize computer clock and intoxilyzer clock, Intoxilyzer Instrument Printer Card, which documented the testing of defendant, included officer's handwritten notation, "Observation Began at 2313 hrs", and printer card contained computer printout line stating "Subject Test.223 23:36 EDT". 500 Ky.Admin.Regs. 8:030 § 1(1). Eldridge v. Com., 68 S.W.3d 388 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001)
Noncompliance and refusal: A driver's act in not blowing into a breath testing machine and by blowing around the mouthpiece to prevent the necessary quantity of air to proceed into the machine may be considered a refusal to submit to a chemical test, so as to support revocation of driver's license. V.A.M.S. § 577.041. Tarlton v. Director of Revenue, State, 201 S.W.3d 564 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2006)
Tampering charge: A person's blood alcohol content, as it exists inside their body and within their control, does not constitute "physical evidence," or a "thing presented to the senses" for purposes of statute making tampering with evidence a crime; potentially measurable amounts of blood still within the human body do not constitute evidence, and until one's breath or blood has been obtained or collected for analysis, it cannot be considered either "physical evidence" or a "thing presented to the senses.” Thus defendant who had three double shots of whiskey and half a beer following truck accident but before highway patrol officer asked defendant to take blood alcohol level (BAC) tests did not tamper with the evidence, as BAC level while still within defendant's body was not "physical evidence." Montana Code § 45-7-207. State v. Peplow, 2001 MT 253, 307 Mont. 172, 36 P.3d 922 (2001)
Allowing State to establish foundation for Intoxilizer result through annual certification form for Intoxilizer, which was hearsay, without calling records custodian for certification form, did not violate defendant's confrontation rights; annual certification form was not substantive evidence used to prove charged offense, and thus certification form was not offered or admitted under state crime laboratory hearsay exception, but merely offered as part of foundation required for admission of other substantive evidence. Fed R Evid Rules 104(a), 803(8); Mont.Admin.R. 23.4.214. State v. Delaney, 1999 MT 317, 297 Mont. 263, 991 P.2d 461 (1999)
In State v. Fuller, 24 NC App 38, 209 SE2d 805, the court granted new trial after a conviction for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors and resisting an officer, holding that the failure of the state to establish that the defendant was accorded his statutory right as to advice that he could have another blood alcohol test administered rendered the results of a breathalyzer test inadmissible in evidence, its admission over objection constituting prejudicial error.
Allegation that blood sample of defendant charged with driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance (DUI) was improperly refrigerated before hospital conducted blood alcohol content (BAC) tests was insufficient to require state to provide additional evidence to prove reliability of BAC test, since allegation was a general and speculative allegation of testing error. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(c). Com. v. Demark, 2002 PA Super 170, 800 A.2d 947 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)
Chemical intoxication tests—Statutory presumptive intoxication levels
Forensic scientists in the employ of the state and national safety organizations have attempted to establish that, at a certain level of alcohol in the blood, any individual would be intoxicated. Interestingly, there is some difference in state legislation as to the exact percentage considered to establish that the individual was intoxicated, ranging from a low of 0.08 percent to no set limit. Probably 0.15 percent is the most generally accepted limit, but 0.10 percent is gaining support. In several areas, the state's experts now will testify that 0.10 percent of blood alcohol places the subject "under the influence," whereas the same experts previously testified that it took 0.15 percent.
All states presently set presumptive intoxication levels in terms of blood-alcohol concentration. Expert witnesses generally are not required to interpret the results of chemical intoxication tests enumerated in statutes creating presumption or other inference of intoxication from specified percentages of alcohol in the system. Despite a test result creating a presumption of intoxication, the jury may acquit if the defendant's guilt is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In most states, an agency of the state government has responsibility for determining the appropriate methods of handling chemical intoxication tests and for certifying testing operations.
Statutes generally establish presumptive levels of intoxication in terms of blood alcohol patterned after the Uniform Chemical Test for Intoxication Act § 7. Uniform Chemical Test for Intoxication Act § 7 provides that if chemical analysis indicates 0.05 percent or less alcohol by weight in a person's blood such fact is prima facie evidence that the person was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, that if the concentration of alcohol was in excess of 0.05 percent but less than 0.15 percent by weight such fact was relevant but not to be given prima facie effect in establishing that the person was or was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and that if 0.15 percent or more alcohol by weight was disclosed by the test such fact was prima facie evidence that the person was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
Chemical intoxication tests—Automatic or per se DWI statutes
Cases:
Driving under the influence (DUI) statute that prohibited persons under age 21 from driving with a blood alcohol level of .02 or more, while prohibiting persons 21 and over from driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 or more, did not violate equal protection rights of younger group; statute was rationally related to the proper governmental purpose of prohibiting underage drinking and driving. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Code 1975, §§ 28-1-5, 32-5A-191. Jolly v. State, 858 So. 2d 305 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002), cert. denied, (Mar. 28, 2003)
In order to support a charge of "traditional DUI", the State must prove that a defendant was driving or in physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; in contrast, to support a charge of "per se DUI," the State need not prove that the defendant was under the influence while driving or controlling a vehicle, as it suffices to prove that, within two hours of driving or controlling a vehicle, the defendant had an alcohol concentration at or exceeding the statutorily determined rate. Arizona Revised Statutes § 28-1381A1, 2. Guthrie v. Jones, 202 Ariz. 273, 43 P.3d 601 (Ct. App. Div. 1 2002)
Because state chose to prosecute driver for violation of "per se" paragraph of drunk-driving statute, and not for violation of "under influence" paragraph, proof of properly administered chemical test showing blood-alcohol level higher than statutory standard of 0.10 percent was conclusive proof of violation, without need for proof that defendant's driving was impaired. State v. Edmondson (1994, Idaho App) 867 P2d 1006.
"Zero tolerance law," which makes it a crime for anyone under age of 21 to drive with blood alcohol content of 0.02 percent or higher is rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose of reducing teenage traffic fatalities and protecting all members of the public and thus does not violate equal protection rights of those prosecuted under that law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Const. §§ 1 to 3; KRS 189A.010(1)(e). Com. v. Howard, 969 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1998).
Evidence supported conviction for violation of per-se drunk-driving statute forbidding driving with blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more, where breath test whose proper administration was disputed showed 0.09 percent, test had barely sufficient margin of error of 0.015 percent to support defendant's claim that blood-alcohol level could have been below 0.08 percent, and ample evidence of erratic driving supported inference that level was 0.08 percent or more. State v. Weeks (1993, Me) 634 A2d 1275.
Minors: Statute, by imposing strict liability upon driver under age of 21 who has alcohol concentration of 0.02 or more, regardless of whether his ability to drive is impaired, does not create conclusive burden-shifting presumption that violates Due Process Clause; statute does not create factual presumption with respect to when illegal alcohol concentration is present, and impairment is not element of crime. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Montana Code § 61-8-410. State v. Luchau, 1999 MT 336, 297 Mont. 415, 992 P.2d 840 (1999)
Trial court in prosecution for driving under influence of alcohol erred in instructing jury as to statutory presumptions arising from various blood alcohol levels (less than 0.05 percent, presumed not intoxicated; 0.05–.10, blood alcohol level may be evidence of intoxication; more than 0.10, presumed under influence), without also instructing that presumed fact (driver under influence) allowed by third presumption must nevertheless be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and where jury returned general guilty verdict without distinguishing between traditional "under influence" charge based on presumptions and "per se" offense based on blood alcohol level alone. Long v. State (1993, Nev) 853 P2d 112.
Where the defendant's blood alcohol content was measured at.141 percent about 2 hours after his arrest, the blood alcohol content did not represent a substantial departure from the permissible limit and could have been below.10 percent when he was stopped and risen above the limit during the substantial delay prior to testing and, therefore, the inference of guilt was too weak to support the defendant's conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol content of.10 percent or greater in the absence of evidence relating his blood alcohol content test results back to the time of driving. Commonwealth v. Loeper (1995, Pa) 663 A2d 669.
Driving under the influence of alcohol statute (DUI) merely created a permissive evidentiary inference, rather than a mandatory presumption, that a driver had a blood alcohol content of.10 percent or more at the time of driving if a test, conducted within three hours after driving, indicated a blood alcohol content of.10 percent or more, and thus, statute did not create the unconstitutional prospect of conviction for innocent conduct, in that it did not preclude a defendant from admitting evidence that his blood alcohol content was below the legal limit at the time of driving. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a)(1). Com. v. Murray, 2000 PA Super 84, 749 A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)
Witness's testimony at trial for intoxication manslaughter that results of lab tests on defendant's blood showed a blood alcohol content of 0.18 was based on scientific testing that was sufficiently reliable to prove matter asserted, namely that defendant's blood alcohol content exceeded "per se" level of 0.10, even though defendant challenged precision of lab's measurements of his blood alcohol level; lab tests were accurate to within plus or minus 10%, and potential error in reporting defendant's blood alcohol content at 0.18 did not create a risk that his actual blood alcohol content was lower than "per se" level. V.T.C.A., Penal Code § 49.08; Rules of Evid., Rule 702. Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. App. Beaumont 2007), petition for discretionary review granted, (Sept. 12, 2007)
Chemical intoxication tests—Implied consent laws; effect of refusal to submit to test
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes authorizing the admission in evidence of the results of chemical intoxication tests. These statutes are commonly referred to as "implied consent laws"; they generally declare that driving is a privilege subject to state licensing, with one of the conditions for obtaining a license that the driver submit to a test for intoxication on request. The police must have probable cause to request a chemical intoxication test. Because of differences in language among the state statutes, it is necessary for counsel to consult his state's statute and to refer to supportive case decisions to ascertain the full rights of his client respecting submission to these tests.
Differences in statutory provisions include such matters as sanction or the lack of sanction for refusal to submit to a test, admissibility as evidence of the fact of refusal to submit to test, the type or types of tests that can be made, whether the police or the defendant can choose the type of test to be administered, the qualifications of the persons who give or supervise the tests, the predicate that must be laid for the introduction of results of the tests, whether the defendant is entitled to his own independent test in addition to the one administered by the police, and whether a dead, unconscious, or disabled person may be tested without permission. Implied consent statutes ordinarily do permit the person tested to have a physician of his own choice administer a chemical intoxication test in addition to the one administered at the direction of the police.
The refusal of a motorist to submit to a chemical intoxication test generally constitutes grounds, under implied consent statutes, for the suspension or revocation of his driver's license. In most states, acquittal of the charge of driving while intoxicated does not preclude revocation or suspension of the motorist's license for refusal to submit to the test. However, the motorist generally has a right to a hearing on the question of the reasonableness of his refusal to submit to the test before his license may be revoked or suspended. Currently, the States of Texas, Wisconsin, Mississippi, and North Carolina do not penalize the driver for refusing to submit to the test if a driving while intoxicated case is dismissed or there was a finding of not guilty.
Cases:
Implied consent law applied broadly and generally to those who drive, and did not require proof of actual driving immediately prior to lawful arrest for driving while under the influence; thus, under statute providing for suspension or revocation of driver's license based on refusal to submit to chemical testing under implied consent law, proof that arrestee was driving immediately prior to the arrest was not required; abrogating Weber v. Orr,274 Cal.App.2d 288, 79 Cal.Rptr. 297; Medina v. Department of Motor Vehicles,188 Cal.App.3d 744, 233 Cal.Rptr. 557; Jackson v. Pierce,224 Cal.App.3d 964, 274 Cal.Rptr. 212. West's Ann.Cal.Vehicle Code §§ 13353, 23612. Troppman v. Valverde, 40 Cal. 4th 1121, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 306, 156 P.3d 328 (2007)
Police dispatcher who observed driver's refusal to consent to breath alcohol test over a closed circuit television did not "witness" the refusal, as required to endorse police officer's report of the refusal under the implied consent statute; when a person is observing via closed circuit television, she is completely reliant on the image, and perhaps sound, supplied by the camera in the other room, and as a consequence, there is no guarantee that she will be able to see and hear fully what is happening. C.G.S.A. § 14-227b(c). Winsor v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 101 Conn. App. 674, 922 A.2d 330 (2007)
Defendant's proclaimed fear of needles was not sufficient cause for his refusal to submit to blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test, following his arrest for driving under influence of alcohol (DUI); defendant indicated to officers that he simply "preferred" to have a breath test rather than a blood withdrawal, while defendant expressed general fear of needles, and generally referenced risk of contracting Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), defendant admitted that he had received shots, he denied ever having seen a psychologist for his fear, and he never identified any mental or medical conditions that would be adversely affected by administration of blood withdrawal. Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 41 P.3d 257 (2002)
Testing after "accident": Intoxicated motorist who had been driving vehicle in an out of control manner and who eventually came to a stop in vehicle with a tire missing and damage to vehicle rim, was in an "accident" for purposes of automobile exception to physician-patient privilege contained in implied consent statute, and thus results of blood test taken from motorist were admissible in prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. M.C.L.A. § 257.625a(6)(e). People v. Green, 260 Mich. App. 392, 677 N.W.2d 363 (2004), appeal denied, 471 Mich. 873, 685 N.W.2d 669 (2004)
"Confusion doctrine," under which drunk-driving arrestee might assert confusion arising from proximate advice by arresting or booking officers as to both Miranda right to counsel and implied-consent law that does not allow counsel for decision whether to submit to chemical testing of blood alcohol level, would apply, if at all, only where Miranda warning precede implied-consent warnings. Blomeyer v. State (1994) 264 Mont 414, 871 P2d 1338.
Defendant's due process rights were violated, even though he consented to withdrawal of blood, when he was shackled to hospital bed and held down by six persons while another person withdrew his blood at direction of police officers while defendant was resisting. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Const. Art. 1, § 10. State v. Sisler, 114 Ohio App. 3d 337, 683 N.E.2d 106 (2d Dist.Clark County 1995).
Motorist's fear of invasive medical procedures, including injections and tests using needles, and concern about risk of contracting HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) did not justify refusal to submit to blood alcohol test. Jacobs v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 695 A.2d 956 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997), appeal denied (Pa. Aug. 13, 1997).
Motorist's refusal to sign waiver of hospital-liability form, because he had lost his eyeglasses and was unable to read it, did not constitute refusal to take blood test for purposes of license suspension under implied-consent law, where motorist testified that he did not refuse to take blood test but refused to release hospital from liability by signing form, and waiver of hospital liability was not same as hospital consent form, which did not constitute impermissible precondition to chemical testing so as to excuse motorist's refusal to submit to blood test. Stump v. Department of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing (1995, Pa Cmwlth) 664 A2d 1102.
Motorist's fear that needle to be used to obtain blood sample was not sterile was not valid justification vitiating his refusal to submit to blood-alcohol test. Stenhach v. Department of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing (1994, Pa Cmwlth) 651 A2d 218.
Defendant failed to establish that she was physically unable to provide an alcohol breath test sample, and thus the Commonwealth was under no duty to prove that it offered defendant a blood test, during prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI); defendant provided no medical records or witness testimony to substantiate her claim that she had a chronic lung condition, she had successfully completed breath tests on two prior occasions when she was convictions of two prior DUI's, and police officer testified that defendant provided an adequate breath sample when he stopped her vehicle, that she failed to provide an adequate breath sample after he brought her to the police station, and that he believed that she "was not trying to give him a proper breath." West's V.C.A. § 18.2-268.2, subds. A, B. Sawyer v. Com., 43 Va. App. 42, 596 S.E.2d 81 (2004)
"RI DUI - Selecting and preparing expert witnesses"
Defense counsel generally should match expert for expert with the prosecution by locating and preparing defense experts including breath test operators and supervisors, physicians, forensic chemists, toxicologists, and, when relevant, accident reconstruction engineers. Physicians, nurses, medical technicians, chemists and accident reconstruction engineers are relatively easy to find. A qualified expert on breath tests who is not already employed by or retained by the state, on the other hand, is much more difficult to find.
Cases:
In a prosecution for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs and causing injury, driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.10 percent or greater and causing injury, and being under the influence of a controlled substance (cocaine), the trial court did not err in permitting the People's expert, the chief forensic toxicologist at a county crime laboratory, to testify regarding the combined effects of alcohol and cocaine. Given the paucity of studies on the subject, it was quite proper to allow the expert to draw an inference based on her extensive knowledge of physiology, pharmacology, depressants and stimulants and, specifically, alcohol and cocaine. Work in a particular field is not an absolute prerequisite to qualification as an expert in that field. With the understanding that the expert had neither been trained in nor conducted studies on the combined effects, and that her opinion was based upon inference, the jury could properly weigh her testimony that cocaine would not counteract the noxious effects of alcohol against defendant's contrary testimony. People v. Coyle (1994, 6th Dist) 22 Cal App 4th 1679, 28 Cal Rptr 2d 488, 94 CDOS 1628, 94 Daily Journal DAR 2821, review gr (Cal) 31 Cal Rptr 2d 125, 874 P2d 900, 94 CDOS 4054, 94 Daily Journal DAR 7523 and reprinted for tracking pending review (6th Dist) 28 Cal App 4th 66.
Opinion on field sobriety test false positives: Erroneous statistical data elicited by defendant from expert on field sobriety tests regarding alleged percentage of sober persons who fail field sobriety tests opened door for State on cross-examination to point out error that manual from which statistical evidence was drawn did not use terms "sober" or "intoxicated" but instead provided statistics for persons with blood alcohol content of .10 or more who failed tests. Schmidt v. State, 816 N.E.2d 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), transfer denied, 831 N.E.2d 743 (Ind. 2005).
In prosecution for DUI, third offense, trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for appointment and payment of expert witness to challenge reliability of Breathalyzer tests where issue of reasonableness of time between arrest and administering of test was particularly important in case, and thus defendant could not have safely proceeded to trial without appointment of expert to testify about reliability of tests following delay between time of arrest and administering of tests. People v. Jacobsen (1994) 205 Mich App 302, 517 NW2d 323.
Selecting and preparing expert witnesses—Breath-test expert
Since the defense attorney cannot expect the state's chemist to bring out or embrace the literature that is unfavorable to breath tests, locating an expert breath-test witness for the defense can make the difference between "guilty" and "not guilty" verdicts in many cases. Ideally, such an expert holds advanced degrees in chemistry, has attended schools on the operation of breath-testing devices, is familiar with the literature on the subject, and personally participated in experiments. The best places to search for such an expert are in college chemistry departments, professional societies, and independent testing laboratories. However, in many areas it is impossible to find a breath test expert to testify for the defense because there are none. About the only way to cope with such a situation is to locate a qualified chemist and persuade him to study information on the breath-test device. If qualified by intense recent study of the literature and experience with the particular testing device, any chemist would be qualified concerning the accuracy of the test, and could give an opinion regarding the defendant's intoxication based on the blood-alcohol content shown by the police-administered test.
Although experts in DUI case can be expensive and labor intensive, they are generally worth the effort if feasible. Experts are seldom utilized unless serious bodily injury or death are present; however if possible, experts should be used more frequently.
"Field Sobriety Tests in Rhode Island - Proof of Intoxication"
Alternatively, a suspect may be asked to put his finger to his nose, to balance on one foot, perhaps with the eyes closed, to balance on a narrow stool, to stand or walk heel to toe, to work mathematical problems, or to do any other task where the results are thought likely to corroborate police opinion of intoxication. However, the successful or unsuccessful accomplishment of any of the above tasks indicates little or nothing regarding intoxication in the light of individual performance differences and the effect of various medical conditions on performance.
The police have sometimes shone a light into the eyes of a suspect and testified that the manner of the contraction of the pupil indicated intoxication. However, medical authorities do not presently consider the manner of contraction of the pupil to have substantial relationship to intoxication, at least when the suspect's normal reaction is not known.
The arresting officer's testimony as to the slowness of the pupils to react may be easily discredited as a valid intoxication test if the arresting officer had no mechanical means of timing the slowness of pupil reaction. It also is apparent that the officer is not qualified medically to distinguish other conditions that might cause slowness of pupil reaction. The following cases shed light on the various legal issues surrounding the field sobriety tests. Read More...
"RI License Suspension"
Depending on state law, the attorney may or may not be able to help his client retain his driver's license and vehicle registrations. In some states the trial judge decides the matter of revocation or suspension and, in this situation, the attorney may be able to minimize the penalty. In other states, the period of suspension is automatically set by law or the state highway patrol organization is given the right, within certain limits, to determine the length of the suspension. In many jurisdictions, such as Rhode Island, the revocation of a driver's license is mandatory on conviction for driving while intoxicated.
In light of the fact that the minimum license suspension for refusing to submit to a chemical test in Rhode Island is six (6) months, and the minimum license suspension for criminal DUI is three (3) months, DUI clients often have a difficult decision to make. Do they opt for one or the other, or should they risk challenging both cases based on a factual or legal weakness in the case? Rhode Island DUI lawyers are accustomed to weighing the pros and cons of these relative decisions. Read More...
"Operation Elements of DUI Cases"
Rhode Island’s statute defining the offense of driving while intoxicated requires that the defendant exert some type of control over the vehicle. If a question exists concerning such control, the defense attorney should certainly investigate the matter. Also, the place where the vehicle was observed in operation is very important. Many statutes prohibit the operation of vehicles by an intoxicated driver only on certain types of public property. If any reasonable question exists as to the public character of the property, the defense attorney should consider the use of surveyors and title attorneys, if necessary, either to prove the private character of the area where the vehicle was operated, or to create reasonable doubts as to its public nature. Read More...
"Breathalyzer Elements for Admissibility"
1. That the subject was legally arrested for driving while intoxicated prior to the demand for the test;
2. That the operator of the device was properly trained and licensed;
3. That the operator and the device were under adequate supervision by an expert;
4. That the chemicals used were compounded properly;
5. That the test was administered in accordance with the test methods directed by the state agency that supervises intoxication test results.
6. That nothing alcoholic was in the subject's mouth for 15 to 30 minutes before the test;
7. That the person interpreting the results of the test was qualified to do so; and
8. That the reading of blood-alcohol content showed a violation of the state statute creating a presumption of intoxication. Read More...
"In a RI DUI case, the attorney of record should have an in depth knowledge of the constitutional requisites for the admissibility of evidence."
"A first offense of driving while intoxicated can carry more than the six months' jail penalty"
In jurisdictions where previous driving-while-intoxicated convictions enhance the penalty, the arresting officer normally does not know whether the conduct observed in the instant case constitutes a misdemeanor or felony violation, and will not know until the suspect's record has been checked. Consequently, it would seem that good police procedure in these jurisdictions should entail the giving of constitutional warnings as soon as an arrest is made in any driving-while-intoxicated case. In an RI DUI, DWI, or driving under the influence prosecution, the police will read the suspect their “Rights for use at scene, which is essentially the equivalent of “Miranda” Rights. Read More...
"In Rhode Island, Drunk Driving, DUI, DWI, Sobriety Checkpoints are unconstitutional."
"A majority of DUI and DWI arrests for driving while intoxicated are made without warrants and are based on personal observation of the suspect's conduct by the arresting officer."
Currently, traffic safety proponents are urging that a police officer be authorized by statute to make a misdemeanor arrest for driving while intoxicated where the crime was not committed in his presence but where, after personal investigation, he finds reasonable grounds to believe that the person did commit the offense. These traffic safety people believe that such increased authority in the area of arrest would be helpful in the investigation of traffic accidents in which it is apparent that one driver was intoxicated but where the officer did not observe the accident.
In a few cases, a charge for driving while intoxicated may be filed solely on the basis of the complaint of a private citizen, and the police fear that the suspect is about to flee the jurisdiction. In these situations, whether a warrant must be issued to make a misdemeanor arrest, or whether the police may make a felony arrest without a warrant on the ground that there is insufficient time to secure a warrant depends on whether the suspect is still intoxicated at the time he is approached by the police. Of course, if some action occurs in their presence that gives them probable cause to stop him, the police may make a valid arrest without a warrant. However, if the suspect is not still intoxicated, and the police are not certain that a felony is involved, a warrant must be secured unless one of the police officers knows of previous convictions of the suspect that would raise the instant offense to a felony level. Consider the following cases: Read More...
"In a Rhode Island Drunk Driving, DWI, DUI prosecution, a criminal defense attorney should always attempt to prove the incompetent administration of field sobriety tests."
Results of field sobriety tests did not provide probable cause to arrest motorist for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), where city police officer administered the tests incompetently and in ways that could completely undermine their reliability; for example, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) required minimum of 32 seconds for horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test and minimum of 12 seconds for vertical gaze nystagmus (VGN) test, but officer performed the tests in 19 seconds and 3.5 seconds, respectively, and officer also did not comply with NHTSA standards for administering one-leg stand test and walk-and-turn test. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Strickland v. City of Dothan, AL, 399 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (M.D. Ala. 2005); West's Key Number Digest, Automobiles 349(6).
Administering a breathalyzer test and having a defendant perform the field sobriety test on videotape after a DUI arrest are nothing more than the collection and preservation of physical evidence, and they do not constitute a crucial confrontation requiring the presence of counsel. State v. Burns (1995, Fla App D5) 661 So 2d 842, 20 FLW D 1942.
Exclusion of the results of driver's blood alcohol test and DUI videotape on relevance grounds was reversible error, where driver who had been arrested on a DUI charge sued officer for false arrest, and after a jury verdict for officer, contended that the test results and the videotape made 2 hours after her arrest were relevant and should have been admitted. Tracton v. Miami Beach (Fla App, 1992) 616 So 2d 457, 18 FLW D 86.
Admission of videotape of defendant's arrest did not violate defendant's right to privacy in prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI), where videotape captured defendant's actions on a public street. State v. Ditton, 2006 MT 235, 333 Mont. 483, 144 P.3d 783 (2006); West's Key Number Digest, Automobiles 354(6).
Videotape of defendant's police station booking was relevant evidence in prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI); videotape showed defendant walking and talking, and jury might have found videotape useful to determine whether defendant was intoxicated. N.R.S. 48.015. Angle v. State, 942 P.2d 177 (Nev. 1997). Read More...
"How recent interpretations of Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules will impact admissibility of Breathalyzer certificates in drunk driving, DUI, DWI, and Driving under the influence prosecutions…"
Court of Appeals of Virginia,
Richmond.
Phillip Lawton GRANT
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
Record No. 0877-08-4.
Sept. 1, 2009.
Background: Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Fairfax County, Bruce D. White, J., of driving while intoxicated. Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Petty, J., held that:
(1) attestation clause in certificate memorializing the results of a blood test was testimonial in nature, and its admission violated the Confrontation Clause, and
(2) admission of certificate in violation of Confrontation Clause was not harmless error, and required reversal.
Reversed and remanded.
Present: FELTON, C.J., and FRANK and PETTY, JJ.
PETTY, Judge.
*716 Appellant, Phillip Lawton Grant, challenges his conviction for driving while intoxicated, in violation of Code § 18.2-266. Grant argues that his conviction should be reversed because the certificate of the results of a chemical analysis of his breath indicating his blood alcohol level was admitted into evidence in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.FN1 **86 For the reasons explained below, we agree with Grant and reverse his conviction.
FN1. Grant's question presented on appeal is:
Whether the trial court erred by denying appellant's motion to exclude from evidence, or alternatively to strike from evidence, the certificate of analysis because the Commonwealth failed to comply with appellant's timely “Notice of Defendant's Exercise of Confrontation Rights Pursuant to Va.Code 19.2-187.1.”
While both parties argued that the statutes governing the admissibility of the breath test certificate are Code §§ 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1, the express statutory authority for the admission of a breath test certificate is set out in Code § 18.2-268.9.Code § 19.2-187 is limited to certificates of analysis prepared by the Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services, the Department of Forensic Science, and certain other enumerated laboratories. Further, Code § 19.2-187.1 only provides for a right by the defendant to examine persons performing analysis pursuant to Code § 19.2-187. It does not appear that the Fairfax County Adult Detention Center is one of the laboratories enumerated in Code § 19.2-187. However, whether the parties and the trial court relied upon the correct statutory scheme addressing the admissibility of the breath test certificate is not before us in this appeal. Therefore, we assume without deciding for the purposes of this opinion that Code § 19.2-187.1 is applicable to this case.
"In Rhode Island, DUI, DWI, Driving Under the Influence, and Drunk Driving cases seem to provide motorists with minimized constitutional protections under the law."
In cases where the police should have recognized that the cause of the apparently intoxicated behavior was not alcohol, but was instead a medical condition from which the subject was suffering, a cause of action may exist against the police for failure to assure that the defendant was immediately delivered to a hospital for medical treatment. Of course, it becomes very important to provide alternate reasons for the suspect’s failure to properly perform standardized field sobriety tests.
In one Federal case, officers had probable cause to arrest motorist at roadblock, and such seizure did not violate his civil rights, where officer received report that possibly intoxicated driver was slumped over steering wheel of vehicle parked on shoulder of interstate, motorist's appearance indicated that he had been drinking, motorist declined to answer officer's questions and drove away without explanation, motorist failed to stop when officer engaged his emergency equipment, bumped motorist's vehicle,and shot out his tires, and motorist swerved to prevent officer from passing him. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Latta v. Keryte, 118 F.3d 693 (10th Cir. 1997). Read More...
"Pursuant to Rhode Island Drunk Driving, DWI and DUI procedures, a driver is entitled to refuse to take a chemical test upon the request of law enforcement."
This blog entry also discusses the application of chemical tests to suspects that are unconscious or in such a medical state that the test is administered for purposes of medical treatment, rather than strictly for law enforcement purposes.
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes authorizing the admission in evidence of the results of chemical intoxication tests. These statutes are commonly referred to as "implied consent laws"; they generally declare that driving is a privilege subject to state licensing, with one of the conditions for obtaining a license that the driver submit to a test for intoxication on request. The police must have probable cause to request a chemical intoxication test. Because of differences in language among the state statutes, it is necessary for counsel to consult his state's statute and to refer to supportive case decisions to ascertain the full rights of his client respecting submission to these tests.
Differences in statutory provisions include such matters as sanction or the lack of sanction for refusal to submit to a test, admissibility as evidence of the fact of refusal to submit to test, the type or types of tests that can be made, whether the police or the defendant can choose the type of test to be administered, the qualifications of the persons who give or supervise the tests, the predicate that must be laid for the introduction of results of the tests, whether the defendant is entitled to his own independent test in addition to the one administered by the police, and whether a dead, unconscious, or disabled person may be tested without permission. Implied consent statutes ordinarily do permit the person tested to have a physician of his own choice administer a chemical intoxication test in addition to the one administered at the direction of the police.
The refusal of a motorist to submit to a chemical intoxication test generally constitutes grounds, under implied consent statutes, for the suspension or revocation of his driver's license. In most states, acquittal of the charge of driving while intoxicated does not preclude revocation or suspension of the motorist's license for refusal to submit to the test. However, the motorist generally has a right to a hearing on the question of the reasonableness of his refusal to submit to the test before his license may be revoked or suspended. Currently, the States of Texas, Wisconsin, Mississippi, and North Carolina do not penalize the driver for refusing to submit to the test if a driving while intoxicated case is dismissed or there was a finding of not guilty. Read More...
"Rhode Island DWI or DUI charge usually falls into one of two categories"
One or more scientific tests presently are conducted in all jurisdictions on driving-while-intoxicated suspects for the purpose of (1) bolstering and corroborating police opinion testimony of intoxication and, (2) in those states that set presumptive blood-alcohol intoxication levels, to demonstrate that the defendant's blood-alcohol level exceeded the permissible. Use of evidence of blood-alcohol concentration helps standardize the opinions of experts and minimizes reliance on the traditional evidence of intoxication on which opinions can vary so widely. Where a scientific test has been made on the defendant, it often is the main weapon of the prosecution, with all other evidence being used to corroborate the test results.
There are four basic scientific tests which may be conducted to determine the degree of intoxication: blood, urine, breath, and saliva tests. The results of urine, saliva, and breath tests for alcohol must be converted into a blood-alcohol reading in order to be useful in determining whether the subject was intoxicated. Read More...
"In Rhode Island, the prosecution can prove the elements of a DWI or DUI charge without the admissibility of a chemical test"
"A trial on a charge of driving while intoxicated may raise constitutional issues"
"Not only are driving under the influence arrests more plentiful, they are becoming more difficult to effectively defend."
Check out this great article on projo.com:
Drunken driving accidents, arrests plentiful in R.I.
http://www.projo.com/news/content/2009_drunken_driving_12-29-09_09GSOV7_v48.3cf7196.html