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"How recent interpretations of Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules will impact admissibility of Breathalyzer certificates in drunk driving, DUI, DWI, and Driving under the influence prosecutions…"

The following case reflects how recent interpretations of the Confrontation Clause and well settled hearsay rules will impact the admissibility of Breathalyzer certificates in drunk driving, DUI, DWI, and Driving under the influence prosecutions…       

Court of Appeals of Virginia,
Richmond.
Phillip Lawton GRANT  v.  COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
Record No. 0877-08-4.
Sept. 1, 2009.

Background: Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Fairfax County, Bruce D. White, J., of driving while intoxicated. Defendant appealed. 

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Petty, J., held that:

(1) attestation clause in certificate memorializing the results of a blood test was testimonial in nature, and its admission violated the Confrontation Clause, and
(2) admission of certificate in violation of Confrontation Clause was not harmless error, and required reversal. 

  
Reversed and remanded.

Present: FELTON, C.J., and FRANK and PETTY, JJ.
PETTY, Judge.

 
  *716 Appellant, Phillip Lawton Grant, challenges his conviction for driving while intoxicated, in violation of Code § 18.2-266. Grant argues that his conviction should be reversed because the certificate of the results of a chemical analysis of his breath indicating his blood alcohol level was admitted into evidence in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.FN1 **86 For the reasons explained below, we agree with Grant and reverse his conviction. 

FN1. Grant's question presented on appeal is:

Whether the trial court erred by denying appellant's motion to exclude from evidence, or alternatively to strike from evidence, the certificate of analysis because the Commonwealth failed to comply with appellant's timely “Notice of Defendant's Exercise of Confrontation Rights Pursuant to Va.Code 19.2-187.1.”  

While both parties argued that the statutes governing the admissibility of the breath test certificate are Code §§ 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1, the express statutory authority for the admission of a breath test certificate is set out in Code § 18.2-268.9.Code § 19.2-187 is limited to certificates of analysis prepared by the Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services, the Department of Forensic Science, and certain other enumerated laboratories. Further, Code § 19.2-187.1 only provides for a right by the defendant to examine persons performing analysis pursuant to Code § 19.2-187. It does not appear that the Fairfax County Adult Detention Center is one of the laboratories enumerated in Code § 19.2-187. However, whether the parties and the trial court relied upon the correct statutory scheme addressing the admissibility of the breath test certificate is not before us in this appeal. Therefore, we assume without deciding for the purposes of this opinion that Code § 19.2-187.1 is applicable to this case.

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"In Rhode Island, DUI, DWI, Driving Under the Influence, and Drunk Driving cases seem to provide motorists with minimized constitutional protections under the law."

In Rhode Island, DUI, DWI, Driving Under the Influence, and Drunk Driving cases seem to provide motorists with minimized constitutional protections under the law. Most police agencies now take the position that the court-recognized status of a driver's license as a privilege, coupled with the statutory authorization for chemical intoxication tests in driving-while-intoxicated cases, amounts to a waiver of a suspect's constitutional rights against self-incrimination and the right to counsel prior to questioning and the giving of the test, unless otherwise provided by state law. Consequently, the normal order of police routine involves (1) a demand on the suspect to take the test, (2) extensive questioning, (3) performing the test, and finally, (4) an offer of an opportunity to the suspect to consult counsel.

   
In cases where the police should have recognized that the cause of the apparently intoxicated behavior was not alcohol, but was instead a medical condition from which the subject was suffering, a cause of action may exist against the police for failure to assure that the defendant was immediately delivered to a hospital for medical treatment.  Of course, it becomes very important to provide alternate reasons for the suspect’s failure to properly perform standardized field sobriety tests. 

   
In one Federal case, officers had probable cause to arrest motorist at roadblock, and such seizure did not violate his civil rights, where officer received report that possibly intoxicated driver was slumped over steering wheel of vehicle parked on shoulder of interstate, motorist's appearance indicated that he had been drinking, motorist declined to answer officer's questions and drove away without explanation, motorist failed to stop when officer engaged his emergency equipment, bumped motorist's vehicle,and shot out his tires, and motorist swerved to prevent officer from passing him. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Latta v. Keryte, 118 F.3d 693 (10th Cir. 1997). Read More...

"A trial on a charge of driving while intoxicated may raise constitutional issues"

A trial on a charge of driving while intoxicated may raise constitutional issues, such as whether there was probable cause for the arrest, whether adequate warnings were given to the suspect as to his rights, whether there was an intelligent waiver of rights, whether there was duress sufficient to raise a defense of self-incrimination, and whether there might have been a violation of equal protection and due process guarantees. The various constitutional questions noted above are necessarily left largely unanswered, because few of such questions have been satisfactorily answered by the courts in the context of prosecutions for driving while intoxicated. Decisions of the United States Supreme Court on these constitutional issues have been rendered in cases involving felonies such as murder, burglary, theft, and possession of narcotics, but the application of such decisions to driving-while-intoxicated cases are not always clear in most instances. Read More...